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Abstract In this paper we present LSJ, a contraction-free sequent calculus for
Intuitionistic propositional logic whose proofs are linearly bounded in the length of
the formula to be proved and satisfy the subformula property. We also introduce a
sequent calculus RJ for intuitionistic unprovability with the same properties of LSJ.
We show that from a refutation of RJ of a sequent σ we can extract a Kripke counter-
model for σ . Finally, we provide a procedure that given a sequent σ returns either a
proof of σ in LSJ or a refutation in RJ such that the extracted counter-model is of
minimal depth.
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1 Introduction
The research on the design of efficient decision procedures for Intuitionistic propo-
sitional logic has a long and articulated history. In the context of sequent calculi the
main concern is the treatment of left implicative formulas, that is implicative for-
mulas occurring in the left-hand side of a sequent (analogously T-signed implicative
formulas in tableau calculi). These formulas are the main source of inefficiency in
proof-search for known calculi and their treatment makes the problem of deciding
Intuitionistic propositional logic Pspace-complete [16].
Gentzen’s early sequent calculi [6] for Intuitionistic logic were based on the re-use
of left implicative formulas. The major drawback of this solution is that deductions
may have infinite depth, hence some loop-checking mechanism is needed to guar-
antee termination. Vorob’ev [20] introduced rules to treat left-implicative formulas
according to the main connective of the antecedent. See also [4, 11, 14], where calculi
with analogous properties are given. In these cases, the re-use of formulas is avoided
by replacing A → B on the left with “simpler” formulas. However, such simpler
formulas are not subformulas of A → B, thus the calculi do not have the subformula
property: as an example, the formula (A ∨ B) → C is replaced with A → C and
B → C. Giving a suitable measure on formulas one can guarantee that derivations in
these calculi have bounded depth. Although the decision procedures for these calculi
do not need loop-checking mechanisms, the rules to treat left implicative formulas of
the kind (A ∨ B) → C and (A → B) → C still generate proofs whose depth is not
linear in the size of the formula to be proved. This problem is overcome in [11], where
proofs have linear depth and the related decision procedures require O(n log n)-
space. A further refinement is given in [5] where, in the context of tableau calculi,
extra rules are added to treat implications of the kind (A → B) → C according with
the main connective of B.
In spite of the efficiency of the related decision procedures, all the above men-
tioned calculi lack of a fundamental feature: the subformula property. The calculus
LSJ we present in Section 3 meets the subformula property, is terminating and its
proofs have linear depth. Following the ideas of a previous work of the authors on
constructive description logics [1], LSJ handles sequents with a third set of formulas
besides the usual sets of left and right formulas and it uses a three-premise rule to
treat left implicative formulas.
We remark that, even if termination can be easily achieved also for the calculi
in [4, 5, 11, 14, 20], the subformula property provides a more elegant termination
argument. Moreover, our rules better capture the original goal of Gentzen [6] to
justify connectives via introduction rules acting on their subformulas.
In Section 3 we also present the sequent calculus RJ, strongly related with
LSJ, for asserting Intuitionistic unprovability. RJ is similar to the refutation calculi
described in [15, 21]. In Section 4 we provide a decision procedure for Intuitionistic
propositional logic which returns either a proof (a derivation in LSJ) or a refutation
(a derivation in RJ) of the input sequent. Since, as discussed in Section 4, from a refu-
tation of a sequent σ we can extract a Kripke counter-model for σ , the correctness of
the decision procedure implies the completeness of LSJ. As discussed in Section 5 the
above decision procedure can be modified so as to generate refutations giving rise to
counter-models with minimal depth. In particular, in the case of classical non-valid
formulas it generates Kripke counter-models consisting of a single world.
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2 Preliminaries
We consider the propositional language L based on a denumerable set of propo-
sitional variables PV , the logical connectives ∧, ∨, → and the logical constant ⊥.
Writing formulas we assume that ∧ and ∨ bind stronger than →. We treat ¬A as a
shorthand for A → ⊥. A formula is atomic if it is a propositional variable or ⊥.
A (f inite) Kripke model for L is a structure K = 〈P,≤, ρ, V〉, where:
– 〈P,≤, ρ〉 is a finite poset with minimum ρ;
– V is a function mapping every α ∈ P to a subset of PV such that α ≤ β implies
V(α) ⊆ V(β).
We write α < β to mean α ≤ β and α = β. The forcing relation ⊆ P × L of K is
defined as follows:
– K, α  ⊥ and, for every p ∈ PV , K, α  p iff p ∈ V(α);
– K, α  A ∧ B iff K, α  A and K, α  B;
– K, α  A ∨ B iff K, α  A or K, α  B;
– K, α  A → B iff, for every β ∈ P such that α ≤ β, K, β  A or K, β  B.
Monotonicity property holds for arbitrary formulas, i.e.: K, α  A and α ≤ β imply
K, β  A. A formula A is valid in K iff K, ρ  A. It is well-known that Intuitionistic
propositional logic Int coincides with the set of formulas valid in all (finite) Kripke
models [2]. A final world of K is an element φ ∈ P such that, for every α ∈ P, φ ≤ α
implies φ = α. The depth ofK, denoted by depth(K), is the length of the longest path
from its root to a final world of K.
3 Sequent Calculi
A sequent σ is an expression of the kind  ; ⇒ 	 where ,  and 	 are (possibly
empty) sets of formulas. We semantically justify sequents as follows: given a Kripke
modelK = 〈P,≤, ρ, V〉 and α ∈ P, α refutes  ; ⇒ 	 inK, writtenK, α   ; ⇒
	, iff the following hold:
(a) for every H ∈  and for every β ∈ P such that α < β, K, β  H;
(b) for every H ∈ , K, α  H;
(c) for every H ∈ 	, K, α  H.
We say that σ is refutable if there exist a Kripke model K and an element α ∈ P
such that K, α  σ ; in this case we say that K is a counter-model for σ . The notion
of refutability is related to the notions of intuitionistic and classical validity by the
following proposition:
Theorem 1 Let ,  and 	 be f inite sets of formulas. Then:
1. ∅ ; ⇒ 	 is refutable if f ∧ → ∨	 is not intuitionistically valid;
2. If ⊥ ∈ , then  ; ⇒ 	 is refutable if f ∧ → ∨	 is not classically valid.
Proof Point 1 easily follows by the definition of refutability. As for point 2, let K =
〈P,≤, ρ, V〉 be a Kripke model and α ∈ P such that K, α   ; ⇒ 	. Since ⊥ ∈ ,
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point (a) above implies that every β > α obeys K, β  ⊥. By definition of forcing,
K, β  ⊥, hence such a β cannot exist. That is, α must be a final world ofK. Let I be
a classical interpretation such that, for every propositional variable p, we have I |= p
iff p ∈ V(α). Then, for every formula A, it holds that K, α  A iff I |= A. Since
K, α  ∧ and K, α  ∨	, it follows that I |= ∧ → ∨	, hence ∧ → ∨	 is
not classically valid. Conversely, let us assume that
∧
 → ∨	 is not classically valid
and let I be a classical interpretation such that I |= ∧ and I |= ∨	. Let K =
〈P,≤ ρ, V〉 be a Kripke model where P only contains ρ and, for every propositional
variable p, it holds that p ∈ V(ρ) iff I |= p. It is easy to check that, for every formula
A, we have K, ρ  A iff I |= A. This implies that K, ρ   ; ⇒ 	, hence  ; ⇒
	 is refutable. unionsq
Note that, by point 1 of the above theorem, a sequent σ =  ; ⇒ 	 with empty
 can be represented by a formula. We do not know if it is possible to extend the
above translation to a generic σ .
In this paper we introduce two sequent-based calculi, one for proving sequents
and one for refuting them. To treat these calculi in a uniform way we introduce the
following definitions. A sequent rule has the form:
σ1 . . . σn
σ R
where σ is a sequent, σ1, . . . , σn (n ≥ 0) is a sequence of sequents and R is the name
of the rule. The sequent σ is called the conclusion of the rule, while σ1, . . . , σn are
called the premises of the rule. If a rule has no premises, we call it an axiom-rule. A
sequent calculus C is a finite set of sequent rules.
A tree is a directed graph where every node is reachable from some unique root
node via a finite number of directed edges; every node except the root has one edge
directed into it, and the root node has no edges directed into it. Given a tree T, we
denote with root(T) the root of T. Given a node a ∈ T, children(a) denotes the set of
the immediate successors of a in T. A leaf is any node a of T such that children(a) =
∅. leaves(T) denotes the set of all the leaves of T. Given a sequent calculus C, a C-tree
is a triple π = 〈T, s, r〉 where:
– T is a finite tree;
– s is a function associating a sequent with every node of T;
– r is a function associating a rule of C with every node of T.
A C-derivation is a C-tree π = 〈T, s, r〉 such that, for every node a ∈ T, if children(a) =
{b 1, . . . , b n} then
s(b 1) . . . s(b n)
s(a)
r(a)
is an instance of a rule in C. We say that π is a C-derivation of the sequent s(root(T)).
The depth of the derivation π , denoted by depth(π), is the depth of the tree T, that
is the maximal length of a path from the root of T to a leaf.
3.1 The Calculus LSJ
The rules of the sequent calculus LSJ are given in Fig. 1. The calculus consists of
left (L) and right (R) introduction rules for the logical constants plus the axiom-rules
Author's personal copy
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Fig. 1 The LSJ calculus
⊥L and Id. Given a sequent  ; ⇒ 	, left rules act on formulas in  and right
rules act on formulas in 	; the set  is modified only by the rules → L and → R.
In the formulation of the rules we write H,  as a shorthand for {H} ∪ . In the
conclusion of a rule, writing H,  we assume that H ∈ , thus the formula H (the
principal formula) is not retained in the premises; e.g., in the rule → L we assume
that A → B ∈ . We call initial sequent of LSJ every sequent that can occur as a
conclusion of an axiom-rule.
Differently from standard presentations, the rule → L has three premises and the
rule → R has two premises; in some cases the premises of these rules can coincide.
As an example, if  and 	 are empty, the two premises of the rule → R are equal
and the two rightmost premises of the rule → L are equal. We also notice that, since
sequents act on sets and the calculus is multi-succedent, we do not need structural
rules.
We call proof an LSJ-derivation π = 〈T, s, r〉. We remark that, for every a ∈
leaves(T), r(a) is an axiom-rule. We say that π is a proof of the sequent s(root(T)).
A formula H is provable in LSJ if there exists a proof of the sequent ∅ ; ∅ ⇒ H.
As the reader can easily check inspecting the rules, LSJ is a contraction-free
calculus and, differently from other well-known contraction-free proposals [4, 5, 11,
14, 20], it has the subformula property: every formula occurring in a derivation is a
subformula of the root sequent.
Example 1 The following is a proof of the formula ((p ∨ (p → q)) → q) → q. We
use the calculus applying the rules backward, hence we read proofs from the root to
the leaves. We remark that the first rule applied in the proof is an instance of → R
where the two premises coincide. Hence, for the sake of conciseness, we only draw
one of the corresponding subproofs.
∅ ; q ⇒ q Id
q ; p ⇒ p, q Id ∅ ; p, q ⇒ q Id
q ; ∅ ⇒ p, p → q, q → R
q ; ∅ ⇒ p ∨ (p → q), q ∨R
q ; p ⇒ p, q Id ∅ ; p, q ⇒ q Id
q ; ∅ ⇒ p, p → q → R
q ; ∅ ⇒ p ∨ (p → q) ∨R
∅ ; (p ∨ (p → q)) → q ⇒ q → L
∅ ; ∅ ⇒ ((p ∨ (p → q)) → q) → q → R
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Example 2 The following is a proof of the double negation of the tertium-non-datur
principle.
∅ ;⊥ ⇒ ⊥ ⊥L
⊥; p ⇒ p,⊥ Id ∅ ;⊥, p ⇒ ⊥ ⊥L
⊥;∅ ⇒ p, ¬p, ⊥ → R
⊥;∅ ⇒ p ∨ ¬p,⊥ ∨R
⊥; p ⇒ ⊥, p Id ∅ ;⊥, p ⇒ ⊥ ⊥L
⊥;∅ ⇒ p, ¬p → R
⊥;∅ ⇒ p ∨ ¬p ∨R
∅ ;¬(p ∨ ¬p) ⇒ ⊥ → L
∅ ; ∅ ⇒ ¬¬(p ∨ ¬p) → R
We remark that the above proof contains redundancies since the two rightmost
subproofs of the → L application essentially coincide. Indeed, applying the rules of
the calculus one could always delete the occurrences of ⊥ in the right-hand side of a
sequent without affecting soundness and completeness.
Redundancies due to the implicit treatment of negation can be avoided by
introducing the following rules:
⊥, ; ⇒ A,	 ⊥;, ⇒ A
 ; ¬A,  ⇒ 	 ¬L
 ; A,  ⇒ 	 ∅ ; A,,  ⇒ ∅
 ; ⇒ ¬A,	 ¬R
We remark that to prove the formulas of the above examples using the Gentzen
calculus LJ or the analogous G1i of [19] one has to apply the contraction rule. In
the case of intuitionistic unprovable sequents the use of contraction requires loop
checking mechanisms to get termination, as in the case of deciding with LJ the
sequent p → q  q.
Given a formula H we denote with dg(H) the number of logical connectives
occurring in H. The degree dg(σ ) of a sequent σ is the sum of the degrees of the
formulas occurring in σ . The reader can easily check that the rules of LSJ have the
following property:
Lemma 1 Let R be an instance of a rule of LSJ and let σ be the conclusion of R. For
every premise τ of R, dg(τ ) < dg(σ ).
By the above lemma we get:
Theorem 2 Let π be an LSJ-derivation of σ , then depth(π) ≤ dg(σ ).
Let R be a rule of LSJ:
– R is sound if the refutability of the conclusion of R implies the refutability of at
least one of its premises;
– a premise of R is invertible if its refutability implies the refutability of the
conclusion;
– R is invertible if all its premises are invertible.
The following is the main lemma to prove the soundness of LSJ.
Lemma 2 Let R be a rule of LSJ with conclusion σ and premises σ1, . . . , σn, let K =
〈P,≤, ρ, V〉 be a Kripke model and α ∈ P such that K, α  σ . There exist a premise σi
and β ∈ P such that α ≤ β and K, β  σi.
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Proof We only discuss the rules → L and → R, the other cases being trivial. Let us
consider the rule → L and let us suppose thatK, α   ; A → B,  ⇒ 	. This means
that K, α  A → B. If K, α  B, then K, α   ; B,  ⇒ 	 and the assertion holds.
Otherwise, K, α  B and hence K, α  A. Since K is finite, there exists β ∈ P such
that α ≤ β,K, β  A and, for every γ ∈ P such that β < γ , it holds thatK, γ  A. If
β = α, then K, β  B, ; ⇒ A,	, otherwise α < β and K, β  B ;, ⇒ A. As
for the rule → R, let us assume that K, α   ; ⇒ A → B,	. Then, there exists
β ≥ α such that K, β  A and K, β  B. If β = α, then K, β   ; A,  ⇒ B,	,
otherwise α < β and K, β  ∅ ; A,,  ⇒ B. unionsq
By the above lemma, all the rules of LSJ are sound, hence:
Theorem 3 (Soundness of LSJ) If a sequent σ is provable in LSJ then it is not
refutable.
Proof Let σ be provable and let π be a proof of σ . If σ were refutable then, by
Lemma 2, some of the sequents in the leaves of π would be refutable, a contradiction
since initial sequents are not refutable. unionsq
As for invertibility of the rules we note that:
– the rules ∧L, ∧R, ∨L, ∨R are invertible;
– the two leftmost premises of the rule → L are invertible;
– the leftmost premise of the rule → R is invertible.
Instead, the rightmost premise of → L and the rightmost premise of → R are
not invertible. Indeed, these premises do not retain the set 	 occurring in the
conclusion and hence, in general, the refutability of these premises does not imply
the refutability of the conclusion.
We remark that, as a consequence of the completeness we discuss in Section 4, the
following cut-rule is admissible.
 ; ⇒ A,	  ;, A ⇒ 	
 ; ⇒ 	 cut
On the other hand, it is easy to see that the other possible formulation of the cut-rule
 ; ⇒ A,	 , A ; ⇒ 	
 ; ⇒ 	
is not sound.
3.1.1 On Inf inite Models
In the literature, the propositional logic Int has been semantically defined as the
set of formulas valid in all finite and infinite Kripke models (that is, Kripke models
K = 〈P,≤, ρ, V〉 where P can be infinite). Subsequently it has been proved that Int
has the finite model property, namely Int coincides with the set of formulas valid in
all finite Kripke models, see [2] for details. The proof of soundness of LSJ discussed
above crucially exploits the finite model property. The problematic rule is → L and
one can easily check that in infinite models → L might not be sound.
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Nevertheless, the soundness of LSJ can be proved without using the finite model
property. We firstly state a property of infinite Kripke models (K1) which implies
the soundness of → L. Then we prove that, if the sequent σ is refutable in an infinite
Kripke model, then it is refutable in a model satisfying (K1).
Let us consider possibly infinite Kripke models K = 〈P,≤, ρ, V〉 having the
following property:
(K1) For every formula A and every α ∈ P, if K, α  A, there is β such that α ≤ β,
K, β  A and, for every γ ∈ P, α < γ implies K, γ  A.
An element β satisfying (K1) is also called maximal world in K relative to A [2].
Note that in Lemma 2 we use Property (K1) to prove the soundness of the rule → L.
Hence Lemma 2 holds in (finite or infinite) models satisfying (K1). To prove the
soundness of the calculus LSJ in infinite models, we have to show that:
(K2) If a sequent σ is (finitely or infinitely) refutable, then σ is refutable in a model
satisfying (K1).
For propositional Intuitionistic logic, (K2) is guaranteed by canonical models.
Indeed, it is well-known [2] that canonical models satisfy (K1) (this can be proved
using Zorn’s Lemma). To prove (K2), let σ =  ; ⇒ 	 and let K = 〈P,≤, ρ, V〉
be a model such that K, α  σ , with α ∈ P; we show that there is a world γ of the
canonical model C such that C, γ  σ . Let ∗ be the set of all the formulas A such
that K, α  A. In the canonical model C there exists a world γ such that C, γ  A iff
A ∈ ∗. This implies that C, γ  A for every A ∈  and C, γ  B for every B ∈ 	.
Now, suppose that there exists C ∈  and γ ′ such that γ < γ ′ in C and C, γ ′  C.
By properties of canonical models, there exists a formula D such that C, γ ′  D and
C, γ  D, which implies C, γ  D → C. It follows thatK, α  D andK, α  D → C,
hence, for some β such that α < β in K, it holds that K, β  D and K, β  C, in
contradiction with the fact that that K, α  σ and C ∈ . This proves that C, γ  σ .
To conclude, the soundness of LSJ can be proved using canonical models.
3.2 The Refutation Calculus RJ
In this section, following ideas from [15], we introduce a refutation calculus RJ
for Intuitionistic propositional logic, that is a calculus to prove that a sequent σ is
refutable. As we discuss later, from an RJ-derivation π of a sequent σ we can extract
a counter-model Mod(π) for σ .
The rules of the calculus RJ are given in Fig. 2. As for LSJ, when H,  occurs in
the conclusion of a rule, we assume H ∈ . In the formulation of the rules we denote
with At and 	At sets of atomic formulas, and with → and 	→ sets of implicative
formulas. A sequent  ; ⇒ 	 is simple if  and 	 only contain atomic formulas.
We call initial sequent of RJ every sequent that can occur as a conclusion of the rule
Irr (the name stands for irreducible), that is all the simple sequents  ;At ⇒ 	At
where At and 	At are disjoint and ⊥ ∈ At.
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Fig. 2 The calculus RJ
There is a tight correspondence between the rules of LSJ and those of RJ.
– The initial sequents of RJ are the simple sequents which are not initial sequents
of LSJ.
– LetR be a rule of LSJ with premises σ1, . . . , σn (n ≥ 1) and conclusion σ and let
σi be an invertible premise of R. Then there exists a rule of RJ having σi as only
premise and σ as conclusion. Rules of this kind are: ∧L, ∧Ri, ∨Li, ∨R, → L1,
→ L2 and → R.
– The non-invertible premises of the rules → R and → L of LSJ are collected in
the rule Succ of RJ. We notice that the rule Succ can be applied only when  and
	 are composed exclusively of atomic or implicative formulas.
We call refutation an RJ-derivation π = 〈T, s, r〉 and we say that π is a refutation
of the sequent s(root(T)).
The notion of soundness for RJ refutation rules is dual to the one given for LSJ
rules. A rule R of RJ is a sound refutation rule if the refutability of all its premises
implies the refutability of its conclusion. Accordingly, if there exists a refutation of
σ , then σ is refutable. We prove the soundness in a stronger sense, showing how to
extract from a refutation π of σ a counter-model Mod(π) for σ .
Let π be a refutation of σ =  ; ⇒ 	; we define the Kripke model Mod(π) =
〈P,≤, ρ, V〉 by induction on the structure of π . Let R be the rule applied at the root
of π :
– If R is Irr, then  ⊆ PV . We set Mod(π) = 〈{ρ}, {(ρ, ρ)}, ρ, V〉 with V(ρ) = .
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– If R is one of the rules ∧L, ∧Ri, ∨Li, ∨R, → Li, → R, let π ′ be the immediate
subderivation of π : then Mod(π) = Mod(π ′).
– If R is Succ, let π1, . . . , πn be the immediate subderivations of π and, for every
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let Mod(πi) = 〈Pi,≤i, ρi, Vi〉. Without loss of generality, we can
assume that the Pi’s are pairwise disjoint. Let ρ ∈ ⋃i∈{1,...,n} Pi, we set:
– P = { ρ } ∪ ⋃i∈{1,...,n} Pi;
– ≤ = { (ρ, α) | α ∈ P } ∪ ⋃i∈{1,...,n} ≤i;
– V(ρ) =  ∩ PV ;
– for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and α ∈ Pi, V(α) = Vi(α).
It is easy to check that Mod(π) is a Kripke model. In particular, since passing from
the consequence of a rule to one of its premises the set of propositional variables in
the left-hand side of a sequent does not decrease, we get the monotonicity property
on propositional variables. We also note that in the model obtained by an application
of the rule Succ, for every formula H, every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and every α ∈ Pi, we have
that Mod(π), α  H iff Mod(πi), α  H. The only rule of RJ generating new worlds
in the counter-model is Succ. Thus, given a refutation π of σ , if k is the number of
implications occurring in σ we have:
– the depth of Mod(π) is at most k;
– given a world α in Mod(π) the number of immediate successors of α is at most k.
We prove the main property of Mod(π).
Theorem 4 Let π be a refutation of σ . Then, Mod(π), ρ  σ , where ρ is the root of
Mod(π).
Proof The proof goes by induction on the structure of π . We only discuss the case
where the rule applied at the root of π is Succ, the other cases being easy. Let
σ =  ;At, → ⇒ 	At,	→ be defined as in Fig. 2 and let Mod(π) = 〈P,≤, ρ, V〉.
Since V(ρ) = At and At ∩ 	At = ∅, we immediately have that Mod(π), ρ  p for
every p ∈ At and Mod(π), ρ  p for every p ∈ 	At. Let π1, . . . , πn be the immediate
subderivations of π . Each πi is a refutation of a sequent σi = i ;i ⇒ 	i occurring
in the premise of Succ. By the induction hypothesis, denoting by ρi the root of
Mod(πi), it holds that Mod(πi), ρi  σi, which implies Mod(π), ρi  σi. Let A → B ∈
→ and let k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that σk = B ;,At, → \ {A → B} ⇒ A. We show
that:
(1) for every j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that j = k, Mod(π), ρ j  A → B;
(2) for every α ∈ P such that ρk < α, Mod(π), α  B;
(3) Mod(π), ρk  A.
If j = k, then A → B belongs to  j; by the induction hypothesis, Mod(π j), ρ j 
A → B, and this implies point (1). Let us consider the model Mod(πk). Since
Mod(πk), ρk  σk, it holds that Mod(πk), ρk  A and, for every α ∈ Pk such that
ρk < α, Mod(πk), α  B; hence points (2) and (3) follow. Now, let α ∈ P such
that Mod(π), α  A. By point (3) and monotonicity, it holds that α = ρk and α =
ρ, hence either ρ j ≤ α, for some j = k, or ρk < α. In both cases, by points (1)
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and (2), it follows that Mod(π), α  B; this proves that Mod(π), ρ  A → B. Let
C → D ∈ 	→. By definition of the rule Succ there exists l ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that σl =
∅ ; C,, At, → ⇒ D. By the induction hypothesis, it follows that Mod(πl), ρl 
C and Mod(πl), ρl  D, thus Mod(π), ρ  C → D. It remains to prove that for
every H ∈  and for every α ∈ P such that ρ < α, Mod(π), α  H. This follows
by the fact that, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n},  ⊆ i hence, by the induction hypothesis,
Mod(πi), ρi  H. unionsq
In the following examples, to emphasize the relation between the nodes of a
refutation π and worlds of the extracted counter-model Mod(π), we label sequents
occurring in π with an integer value denoting a world of Mod(π). The sequent at the
root of the refutation is labelled with 0, which represents the root of the counter-
model. The only rule which affects labels is Succ. When such a rule is applied its
premises have new distinct labels. A sequent in π with label n is refuted in the world
n of Mod(π). Models are represented as trees with the convention that α < β if the
world β is drawn above node α. Every world is represented by its label followed by
the list of forced propositional variables.
Example 3 The following is a refutation π of the Scott principle [2]
((¬¬p → p) → (¬p ∨ p)) → (¬¬p ∨ ¬p)
where H = (¬¬p → p) → (¬p ∨ p).
2 : ⊥ ; p ⇒ ⊥ Irr
2 : ⊥ ; p ⇒ ¬p → R
2 : ⊥ ;¬p ∨ p ⇒ ¬p ∨L2
1 : ¬p ∨ p ; ¬¬p ⇒ p Succ
1 : ¬p ∨ p ; ∅ ⇒ ¬¬p → p → R
3 : ⊥ ; ∅ ⇒ p,⊥ Irr
3 : ⊥ ;¬p ⇒ p,⊥ → L2
3 : ⊥ ;¬p ∨ p ⇒ p,⊥ ∨L1
3 : ⊥ ; H ⇒ p,⊥ → L1
3 : ∅ ; H,¬p ⇒ ⊥ → L2
4 : ∅ ; p ⇒ ⊥ Irr
4 : ∅ ; ¬p ∨ p, p ⇒ ⊥ ∨L2
4 : ∅ ; H, p ⇒ ⊥ → L1
0 : ∅ ; H ⇒ ¬¬p,¬p Succ
0 : ∅ ; H ⇒ ¬¬p ∨ ¬p ∨R
0 : ∅ ; ∅ ⇒ H → (¬¬p ∨ ¬p) → R
As the reader can easily check, Mod(π) is a counter-model for the Scott principle.
Example 4 The following is a refutation π of the formula
F = (p → (q → r)) ∨ (((x ∨ p) → ((s → t) ∨ (w → (z → x)))) ∨ (u → (v ∧ u))) .
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We note that this formula is not classically valid.
0 : ∅ ; q, p, u, z, w, s ⇒ r, v, x, t Irr
0 : ∅ ; p, u, z, w, s ⇒ q → r, v, x, t → R
0 : ∅ ; u, z, w, s, p ⇒ p → (q → r), v, x, t → R
0 : ∅ ; u, z, w, s, p ⇒ v ∧ u, x, t, p → (q → r) ∧R1
0 : ∅ ; z, w, s, p ⇒ u → (v ∧ u), x, t, p → (q → r) → R
0 : ∅ ;w, s, p ⇒ z → x, t, u → (v ∧ u), p → (q → r) → R
0 : ∅ ; s, p ⇒ w → (z → x), t, u → (v ∧ u), p → (q → r) → R
0 : ∅ ; p ⇒ s → t, w → (z → x), u → (v ∧ u), p → (q → r) → R
0 : ∅ ; x ∨ p ⇒ s → t, w → (z → x), u → (v ∧ u), p → (q → r) ∨L2
0 : ∅ ; x ∨ p ⇒ (s → t) ∨ (w → (z → x)), u → (v ∧ u), p → (q → r) ∨R
0 : ∅ ; ∅ ⇒ (x ∨ p) → ((s → t) ∨ (w → (z → x))), u → (v ∧ u), p → (q → r) → R
0 : ∅ ; ∅ ⇒ ((x ∨ p) → ((s → t) ∨ (w → (z → x)))) ∨ (u → (v ∧ u)), p → (q → r) ∨R
0 : ∅ ; ∅ ⇒ (p → (q → r)) ∨ (((x ∨ p) → ((s → t) ∨ (w → (z → x)))) ∨ (u → (v ∧ u))) ∨R
The following is the counter-model for F extracted from the above refutation.
We remark that our construction generates a Kripke counter-model consisting of a
single world, that is a classical counter-model for F. We note that in [3] the generated
counter-model for F has depth 3 and consists of 8 worlds.
4 Completeness
In this section we provide a function F that takes as input a sequent σ and returns
either a proof or a refutation of σ and we prove its correctness. As a consequence we
get the completeness of LSJ and RJ.
First of all, we define the following gluing constructor on C-trees. Let us consider a
list [π1, . . . , πn] of C-trees, where πi = 〈Ti, si, ri〉; we assume without loss of generality
that the Ti’s are pairwise disjoint. Let σ be a sequent and let R be a rule of C, we
denote with Glue(C, [π1, . . . , πn], σ,R) the C-tree π = 〈T, s, r〉 done as follows:
– let t be a node not occurring in T1, . . . , Tn; T is the tree having T1, . . . , Tn as
subtrees, t as root and children(t) = {root(T1), . . . , root(Tn)};
– s(t) = σ and r(t) = R;
– for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and for every a ∈ Ti, s(a) = si(a) and r(a) = ri(a).
Let us consider an instance of a rule R of LSJ having σ as conclusion and H
as principal formula; we denote with premi(R, σ, H) the i-th premise of this rule
application. If the rule has only one premise, we simply write prem(R, σ, H) instead
of prem1(R, σ, H).
The function F described in Fig. 3 takes as input a sequent σ and returns either
an LSJ-tree or an RJ-tree. Essentially F searches for a proof or a refutation of σ
by applying backward the rules of LSJ and RJ. Informally our algorithm works as
follows:
– If σ is an initial sequent of LSJ (lines 2 and 3) an LSJ-tree is returned;
– If σ is an initial sequent of RJ (line 4) an RJ-tree is returned;
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Fig. 3 The function F
– If the previous cases do not hold, F tries to apply an invertible rule of LSJ (first
trying the rules with one premise and then the branching ones). If this is not
possible, it applies a non-invertible rule. In any case, if the recursive invocations
of F return LSJ-trees, an LSJ-tree is returned, otherwise an RJ-tree is returned.
Now we prove that every execution of F(σ ) terminates returning either a proof or a
refutation of σ .
Theorem 5 Let σ be a sequent:
1. F(σ ) terminates and requires dg(σ ) nested recursive invocations at most;
2. F(σ ) returns either a proof or a refutation of σ .
Proof Point (1) immediately follows by the fact that in F(σ ) every recursive invoca-
tion acts on a sequent σ ′ with dg(σ ′) < dg(σ ).
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Now let π = Glue(C, L, σ,R) be the output of F(σ ). The proof of point (2) goes
by induction on the number N of nested recursive invocations of F. If N = 0 then
one of the return instructions at lines 2, 3 and 4 has been executed; in this case the
assertion immediately follows.
Let us suppose that F(σ ) performs N + 1 nested recursive invocations. The proof
goes by cases on the last executed return instruction. The assertion in the various
cases easily follows by the induction hypothesis. We only discuss the cases where the
last executed return instruction is one of those occurring in lines 21–39. We remark
that if we are executing one of these instructions, no invertible rule of LSJ can be
applied to σ . Hence, we can write σ as  ;At, → ⇒ 	At,	→ where At and 	At
are sets of atomic formulas such that ⊥ ∈ At, At ∩ 	At = ∅, → and 	→ are sets of
implicative formulas with → ∪ 	→ = ∅.
If the last executed return instruction is one of those at lines 24, 26 and 33, then,
by the induction hypothesis, the returned structure is a refutation of σ . If the last
executed return instruction is one of those at lines 28 and 35, then, by the induction
hypothesis, the returned structure is a proof of σ . Let us assume that the last executed
return instruction is that at line 39 andP = {π1, . . . , πn} with n ≥ 1. Since, for every
A → B ∈ →, the instruction at line 29 has been executed and, for every C → D ∈
	→, the instruction at line 36 has been executed, by induction hypothesis we get:
– for every A → B ∈ →,P contains a refutation of B ;,At, → \ {A → B} ⇒
A;
– for every C → D ∈ 	→, P contains a refutation of ∅ ; C,, At, → ⇒ D.
Moreover, At and 	At satisfy the side conditions in Fig. 2. Hence the RJ-tree
Glue(RJ, [π1, . . . , πn], σ, Succ) is a refutation of σ . unionsq
Theorem 6 (Completeness) If the sequent σ is not refutable then it is provable.
Proof By the above theorem, F(σ ) always terminates returning either a proof of
σ or a refutation of σ . If σ is not provable, then F(σ ) returns a refutation π of σ .
By Theorem 4, Mod(π) refutes σ , hence σ is refutable. It follows that, if σ is not
refutable, then it is provable. unionsq
If we rewrite the function F of Fig. 3 as a decision procedure, that is ignoring
proofs and refutations construction, we get a O(n log n)-space algorithm.
5 Properties of Counter-Models
Given a refutable sequent σ =  ; ⇒ 	, the minimum depth of σ is the minimum
among the depths of all the counter-models for σ . Formally, the function md
(minimum depth) assigns to a sequent σ an element of N ∪ {∞}:
md(σ ) =
{
min{ depth(K) | K = 〈P,≤, ρ, V〉 and K, ρ  σ } if σ is refutable
∞ otherwise
Clearly, if K is a counter-model for σ , then depth(K) ≥ md(σ ). In general, when
σ is not provable in LSJ, the model Mod(F(σ )) has not the minimal depth md(σ ),
because F(σ ) stops when the first refutation for σ is found. Since it is possible
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that F disregards some refutations, it is not guaranteed that the returned refutation
describes a model with minimal depth. Here we provide two examples where F fails
to return a counter-model of minimal depth.
Example 5 Let σ be the sequent ∅ ; ∅ ⇒ ((p → q) ∨ (q → p)) ∧ r. Clearly, md(σ ) =
0, since any modelK = 〈{ρ},≤, ρ, V〉 such thatK, ρ  r is a counter-model for σ . On
the other hand, F(σ ) returns the refutation π1 whose associated counter-model has
depth 1.
To get a counter-model of minimal depth, we have to apply ∧R2 (instead of ∧R1)
to choose the subformula r. The related refutation π2 generates a counter-model of
depth 0.
Example 6 Let σ be the sequent ∅ ; ∅ ⇒ p → q, q → p ∧ (p → r ∨ ¬r). F(σ ) re-
turns the refutation π1 whose associated counter-model has depth 2.
The function F applies in (a) the rule → R, and this forces the variable p to be
true in the root 0 of the counter-model. With this choice, the only way to falsify the
formula q → p ∧ (p → r ∨ ¬r) in 0 is the generation of worlds 1 and 2, giving rise to
a counter-model of depth 2. To build a model of depth 1 (the minimal depth of σ ),
we have to apply in (a) the rule Succ instead of → R:
To avoid the above situations and to get counter-models with minimal depth we
have to refine the algorithm F of Fig. 3 in such a way that all the possible refutations
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for σ are built and the one corresponding to a counter-model of minimal depth is
returned. The new algorithm Fmin is given in Fig. 4.
The termination and correctness of Fmin can be proved along the lines of
Theorem 5. The proof of minimality of the returned counter-models rests on the
following properties of md(σ ).
Fig. 4 The function Fmin
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Lemma 3 Let ,  and 	 be sets of formulas.
1. md( ; A ∧ B,  ⇒ 	) = md( ; A, B,  ⇒ 	).
2. md( ; ⇒ A ∧ B,	) = min{md( ; ⇒ A,	), md( ; ⇒ B,	)}.
3. md( ; A ∨ B,  ⇒ 	) = min{md( ; A,  ⇒ 	), md( ;, B ⇒ 	)}.
4. md( ; ⇒ A ∨ B,	) = md( ; ⇒ A, B,	).
Proof The proof of point 1 is immediate, since a counter-model for  ; A ∧ B,  ⇒
	 is a counter-model for  ; A, B,  ⇒ 	 and vice versa; point 4 has an analogous
immediate proof. We prove point 2. Let us define:
σ =  ; ⇒ A ∧ B,	
σA =  ; ⇒ A,	 = prem1(∧R, σ, A ∧ B)
σB =  ; ⇒ B,	 = prem2(∧R, σ, A ∧ B)
and let δ = md(σ ), δA = md(σA), and δB = md(σB). Since a counter-model for σA is
a counter-model for σ , it holds that δ ≤ δA; similarly, δ ≤ δB, hence δ ≤ min{δA, δB}.
Moreover, a counter-model for σ is either a counter-model for σA or a counter-model
for σB, hence either δA ≤ δ or δB ≤ δ, which implies min{δA, δB} ≤ δ. We conclude
δ = min{δA, δB}. The proof of point 3 is similar. unionsq
An analogous property for implicative formulas requires a deeper case analysis. Let
σ be the sequent  ; ⇒ 	. For A → B ∈  and for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, we denote with σ A→BLi
the i-th premise of the rule → L applied to σ with principal formula A → B, that is:
σ A→BL1 = prem1(→ L, σ, A → B) =  ; B,  \ {A → B} ⇒ 	
σ A→BL2 = prem2(→ L, σ, A → B) = B, ; \ {A → B} ⇒ A,	
σ A→BL3 = prem3(→ L, σ, A → B) = B ;, \ {A → B} ⇒ A
Similarly, given C → D ∈ 	 we define:
σC→DR1 = prem1(→ R, σ, C → D) =  ; C,  ⇒ D,	 \ {C → D}
σC→DR2 = prem2(→ R, σ, C → D) = ∅ ; C,,  ⇒ D
Moreover, we set:
δA→BLi = md(σ A→BLi ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3
δC→DRj = md(σC→DRj ) for 1 ≤ j ≤ 2
Lemma 4 Let σ =  ;At, → ⇒ 	At,	→, where At and 	At are sets of atomic
formulas such that ⊥ ∈ At, At ∩ 	At = ∅, → and 	→ are sets of implicative
formulas with → ∪ 	→ = ∅. Let:
DL = { δA→BLk | k ∈ {1, 2} and A → B ∈ → }
DR = { δC→DR1 | C → D ∈ 	→ }
δm = max( { δA→BL3 | A → B ∈ → } ∪ { δC→DR2 | C → D ∈ 	→} )
Then, md(σ ) = min(DL ∪DR ∪ { δm + 1 } ).1
1If δm = ∞ we set δm + 1 = ∞.
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Proof For A → B ∈ → and k ∈ {1, 2}, a counter-model for σ A→BLk is a counter-
model for σ , hence md(σ ) ≤ δA→BLk . This implies that:
(P1) for every δ ∈ DL, md(σ ) ≤ δ.
Similarly, since for every C → D ∈ 	→ a counter-model for σC→DR1 is a counter-
model for σ , we get:
(P2) for every δ ∈ DR, md(σ ) ≤ δ.
We show:
(P3) md(σ ) ≤ δm + 1.
If, for some A → B ∈ →, σ A→BL3 is not refutable, then δm = ∞ and (P3) trivially
holds. Similarly, if σC→DR2 is not refutable for some C → D ∈ →, δm = ∞ and (P3)
holds. Now, let us assume that, for every A → B ∈ → and every C → D ∈ 	→, all
the sequents σ A→BL3 and σ
C→D
R2 are refutable. For every A → B ∈ →, let KA→BL3 be
a counter-model for σ A→BL3 such that depth(KA→BL3 ) = δA→BL3 and for every C → D ∈
	→ let KC→DR2 be a counter-model for σC→DR2 such that depth(KC→DR2 ) = δC→DR2 . We
can build a counter-model K for σ by gluing all the models KA→BL3 and KC→DR2 as
described in the definition of Mod(π) (see Section 3.2). It follows that depth(K) =
δm + 1, which implies (P3). By (P1)–(P3) we conclude:
(P4) md(σ ) ≤ min(DL ∪DR ∪ { δm + 1 } ).
Now we prove the converse of (P4), that is:
(P5) md(σ ) ≥ min(DL ∪DR ∪ { δm + 1 } ).
If σ is not refutable, md(σ ) = ∞ and (P5) holds. Otherwise, let K = 〈P,≤, ρ, V〉 be
a Kripke model such that K, ρ  σ and depth(K) = md(σ ). Firstly, we show that one
of the following properties (i)–(iii) holds:
(i) K, ρ  σ A→BLk , for some k ∈ {1, 2} and A → B ∈ →;
(ii) K, ρ  σC→DR1 , for some C → D ∈ 	→;
(iii) For every A → B ∈ → there exists α = ρ such thatK, α  σ A→BL3 and for every
C → D ∈ 	→ there exists β = ρ such that K, β  σC→DR2 .
Indeed, let us assume that (i) does not hold. By Lemma 2 applied to the rule → L,
for every A → B ∈ → there exists α such that K, α  σ A→BL3 . We cannot have α =
ρ; indeed, if K, α  σ A→BL3 and α = ρ, by the fact that K, ρ  σ we would conclude
K, ρ  σ A→BL2 , against the assumption that (i) does not hold. Similarly, if (ii) does
not hold, for every C → D ∈ 	→ there exists β = ρ such that K, β  σC→DR2 . Thus,
one of the properties (i)–(iii) holds. We show that, according to the case, one of the
following properties (iv)–(vi) holds:
(iv) md(σ ) ≥ δA→BLk , for some k ∈ {1, 2} and A → B ∈ →;
(v) md(σ ) ≥ δC→DR1 , for some C → D ∈ 	→;
(vi) md(σ ) ≥ δA→BL3 + 1 for every A → B ∈ → and
md(σ ) ≥ δC→DR2 + 1 for every C → D ∈ 	→.
If (i) holds, we have depth(K) ≥ δA→BLk and, being depth(K) = md(σ ), (iv) follows.
Similarly, if (ii) holds, we get (v). Suppose now that (iii) holds. Let A → B ∈ → and
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let α ∈ P such that α = ρ and K, α  σ A→BL3 . Let Kα be the submodel of K generated
by α (namely, Kα is the restriction of K to the worlds β such that α ≤ β). It is easy
to check thatKα is a counter-model for σ A→BL3 , hence depth(Kα) ≥ δA→BL3 . By the fact
that ρ < α, we get depth(K) ≥ δA→BL3 + 1, namely md(σ ) ≥ δA→BL3 + 1. In a similar
way, we prove that, for every C → D ∈ 	→, md(σ ) ≥ δC→DR2 + 1, and this concludes
the proof of (vi). Note that (vi) implies:
(vii) md(σ ) ≥ δm + 1
Since one of the cases (iv), (v), (vii) holds, (P5) follows. By (P4) and (P5) we conclude
md(σ ) = min(DL ∪DR ∪ { δm + 1 } ). unionsq
From the above discussion, the main result of this section follows:
Theorem 7 Let σ be a sequent:
1. Fmin(σ ) terminates and requires dg(σ ) nested recursive invocations at most;
2. Fmin(σ ) returns either a proof or a refutation of σ ;
3. If Fmin(σ ) returns a refutation π , then Mod(π) has depth md(σ ).
Proof The proof goes by induction on the number of nested recursive invocations of
Fmin along the lines of the proof of Theorem 5. To prove point (3) we note that, if the
refutation π is returned at line 4, the corresponding counter-model has depth 0. In all
the other cases, point (3) follows by the induction hypothesis and Lemmas 3 and 4.
We treat the more tricky case where π is returned at line 52. We note that, if lines 24–
52 are executed, the input sequent σ can be written as  ;At, → ⇒ 	At,	→ so
that the hypothesis of Lemma 4 are satisfied. When line 51 is reached, Q and Psucc
satisfy the following properties:
– For every A → B ∈ → and k ∈ {1, 2} such that σ A→BLk is refutable,Q contains a
refutation π A→BLk of σ
A→B
Lk (π
A→B
Lk is the refutation added to Q at line 33 or 34).
By the induction hypothesis depth(Mod(π A→BLk )) = δA→BLk .
– For every A → B ∈ → such that σ A→BL3 is refutable, Psucc contains a refutation
π A→BL3 of σ
A→B
L3 . By the induction hypothesis depth(Mod(π
A→B
L3 )) = δA→BL3 .
– For every C → D ∈ 	→ such that σC→DR1 is refutable, Q contains a refutation
πC→DR1 of σ
C→D
R1 . By the induction hypothesis depth(Mod(π
C→D
R1 )) = δC→DR1 .
– For every C → D ∈ 	→ such that σC→DR2 is refutable, Psucc contains a refutation
πC→DR2 of σ
C→D
R2 . By the induction hypothesis depth(Mod(π
C→D
R2 )) = δC→DR2 .
– Suppose that, for every A → B ∈ → and C → D ∈ 	→, all the sequents
σ A→BL3 and σ
C→D
R2 are refutable. Then, the condition at line 47 is true (the
variable is_succ_applicable is set to false only when one of the se-
quents σ A→BL3 or σ
C→D
R2 is provable), hence Q contains the refutation π∗ =
Glue(RJ, [π1, . . . , πn], σ, Succ), where π1,. . . ,πn are all the refutations in Psucc.
Note that depth(Mod(π∗)) = δm + 1, where δm is defined as in Lemma 4.
Let π be the refutation returned at line 52. Then, π is chosen in Q so that
depth(Mod(π)) ≤ depth(Mod(π ′)), for every π ′ ∈ Q. It follows that depth(Mod(π))
is the minimum of DL ∪DR ∪ {δm + 1}; by Lemma 4 we conclude that Mod(π) has
depth md(σ ). unionsq
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6 Related Works
The main difference among LSJ and the terminating calculi in [4, 5, 12, 13, 20] is
that LSJ meets the subformula property. Paper [3] presents a sequent calculus with
the subformula property whose termination is based on the rule a-fortiori; differently
from LSJ the depth of its proofs is not linearly bounded. As for [12], we remark that
STRIP implements some form of subformula property through the use of suitable
data-structures.
The calculus RJ can be compared with CRIP [15], a sequent calculus which
formalizes unprovability in Intuitionistic propositional logic. CRIP is based on LJT*
[4], a multi-succedent variant of the well-known calculus LJT described in the same
paper. CRIP does not meet the subformula property and the depth of its proofs is
not linearly bounded.
In [7] it is provided a calculus which mixes together derivations and refutations
for Bi-intuitionistic logic. An analogous calculus for Intuitionistic logic can be
obtained disregarding the dual-intuitionistic connectives. Also this calculus does not
require loop-checking. In this case, differently from our approach, the proof-search
algorithm outputs derivations or refutations building a single proof-tree. However,
the calculus of [7] does not obey to a linear bound on the depth of deductions.
To compare our approach with those based on histories, see e.g. [8, 10], we remark
that histories and LSJ sequents are quite different mechanisms. Histories store goals
already considered in proof-search and prevent rule applications which might lead
to loops. For instance, the rule → R of [10] can be applied to the sequent  ¬A−→
C;H (H is the history) only if C ∈ H; if C ∈ H the proof-search fails and one has to
backtrack. In our approach, the formulas in  of a sequent  ; ⇒ 	 are never used
to prevent the application of a rule; loop-checking is avoided by the fact that, when a
rule is applied, at least a formula of the sequent is decomposed. Note that formulas
stored in H are passive (no rule acts on them); in LSJ, the formulas in  can be
added to  and become active (see the rules → L and → R). Finally, we point out
that history formulas are not part of the logical meaning of a sequent; for instance, the
sequent 
¬A−→ C;H corresponds to the formula (∧ ∧ ¬A) → C, regardless of the
formulas inH. In LSJ, the logical meaning of  ; ⇒ 	 is expressed by a semantical
condition involving all the components; as noticed in Section 3, we do not know if
 ; ⇒ 	 can be represented by a formula.
As for the procedures for counter-models generation, we quote [3, 9, 12, 17, 18].
As we noticed in Example 4 the counter-models extracted from the procedure
described in [3] are not of minimal depth.
The decision procedure of [9] searches for long normal form proofs and relies
on a non-terminating calculus requiring loop-checking. Also in this case the main
difference with our proposal is that the generated counter-models are not of minimal
depth. As an example, the counter-model for the non-classically valid formula
described in [9] has 5 worlds and depth 3, while our procedure generates a counter-
model consisting of a single (classical) world.
Papers [12, 17] describe tools inspired by the LJT calculus of [4]. In both cases the
generated counter-models are not of minimal depth.
In [18] is presented a decision procedure which allows one to extract a counter-
model from a failed attempt to find a proof. The procedure relies on a calculus whose
proofs have depth O(n2). The author provides an upper bound on the depth and out-
Author's personal copy
Contraction-Free Linear Depth Sequent Calculi for Intuitionistic Propositional Logic 149
degree of generated counter-models. In both cases such a bound is the number of
negative occurrences of implications in the sequent to be proved. By our proof of
minimality we get that also our procedure obeys the bound on the depth of counter-
models.
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